Blockchain Governance: An Overview and Prediction of Optimal Strategies
  using Nash Equilibrium by Khan, Nida et al.
Blockchain Governance: An Overview and Prediction of 
Optimal Strategies using Nash Equilibrium 
Nida Khan1[0000-0003-3096-150X], Tabrez Ahmad2[0000-0001-8370-6727], Anass Patel3,  and Radu 
State1[0000-0002-4751-9577] 
1 SEDAN Research Group, University of Luxembourg, Luxembourg 
2 ArcelorMittal Europe, Luxembourg 
3 570Easi, France 
nida.khan@uni.lu 
Abstract. Blockchain governance is a subject of ongoing research and an inter-
disciplinary view of blockchain governance is vital to aid in further research for 
establishing a formal governance framework for this nascent technology. In this 
paper, the position of blockchain governance within the hierarchy of Institutional 
governance is discussed. Blockchain governance is analyzed from the perspec-
tive of IT governance using Nash equilibrium to predict the outcome of different 
governance decisions. A payoff matrix for blockchain governance is created and 
simulation of different strategy profiles is accomplished for computation of all 
Nash equilibria. The paper elaborates upon payoff matrices for different kinds of 
blockchain governance, which are used in the proposition of novel mathematical 
formulae usable to predict the best governance strategy that minimizes the occur-
rence of a hard fork as well as predicts the behavior of the majority during pro-
tocol updates. The paper also includes validation of the proposed formulae using 
real Ethereum data. 
Keywords: Blockchain governance, Nash equilibrium, Game theory, IT gov-
ernance, Mathematical optimization. 
1 Introduction 
Statistics forecast that the revenue generation from the blockchain industry would be 
equivalent to over $23.3 billion by 2023 from $2.2 billion in 2019 [1]. The expected 
massive growth, the envisaged disruptive nature of the technology and the inception of 
an entirely novel economic dimension by way of cryptoeconomics [2] has managed to 
garner both research and academic interest. The major proponent of blockchain incep-
tion is that it absolves the need to trust intermediaries to enable online transactions 
while providing auditable transparency. Blockchain technology finds diverse applica-
tions in the payments sector, asset management, supply chain management, healthcare, 
digital identity and Internet of Things amongst others. It has been heralded as one of 
the most disruptive innovations of the fourth industrial revolution [3]. 
Blockchain is a technological innovation that works on the concept of distributed 
networks requiring the coordinated efforts of multiple agents that comprise the network. 
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The different agents, like users, founders of the blockchain network and others have 
different incentives that need to be aligned to ensure a uniform and consistent progress 
of the blockchain network. This necessitates the requirement of a governance strategy, 
which consolidates the goals of the stakeholders of the blockchain network to develop 
incentives and strategies for the other agents in the network for providing network con-
sistency and availability. It is predicted that an absence of an apt governance mecha-
nism can stall and result in a sub-optimized blockchain network [4], leading to frequent 
soft and hard forks in the network. A hard fork, though undesirable, is a relatively cost-
effective solution to disagreements, when compared to a split on a traditional structure 
like the government. 
Blockchain governance is a subject of ongoing research and as of now no formal 
definition of blockchain governance exists. The paper attempts to give a formal struc-
ture to blockchain governance consolidating its position within the hierarchy of Insti-
tutional governance. The paper elaborates on the various agents involved in a block-
chain platform and gives an overview of their position in the broader vision of block-
chain governance. The paper discusses the three dimensions of IT governance as they 
apply to blockchain governance. Nash equilibrium is a concept within game theory, 
which has multiple applications in blockchain [5]. In this paper, Nash equilibrium is 
used to predict the outcome of different governance implementation strategies to find 
an optimal strategy that minimizes the occurrence of hard forks. The scenarios of no 
blockchain governance, off-chain and on-chain blockchain governance are discussed, 
to conclude on the best scenario that minimizes the occurrence of hard forks, the occur-
rence of which is unavoidable in many cases. 
The paper is a pioneer in giving a multidisciplinary view of blockchain governance 
and using game theory concepts to analyze different governance strategies. Related 
work is given in section 2. A multi-faceted view of blockchain governance is given in 
section 3 while section 4 gives the relevant background on Nash equilibrium. Applica-
tion of Nash equilibrium and simulations of the developed blockchain governance stra-
tegic game are accomplished to conclude on optimal strategy profiles in section 5. Pay-
off matrices are constructed for off-chain and on-chain blockchain governance and 
mathematically analyzed to derive formulae that can help in prediction of hard forks 
based on the choice of governance decision during a protocol update in subsections 5.3 
and 5.4. Data from Ethereum fork is analyzed to verify the developed formulae in sec-
tion 6. The conclusion of the undertaken study is given in section 7. 
 
2 Related Work 
Davidson et al. view blockchain governance from the perspective of Institutional gov-
ernance [6]. Beck et al. focus on a research framework agenda for blockchain govern-
ance, deriving rules from IT governance [7]. Chohan discuss the governance issues in 
decentralized autonomous organizations [8]. Atzori elaborates on the key points of 
blockchain governance from a political perspective, focusing on the distinguishing 
characteristics from State authority, citizenship and democracy [9]. Reijers et al. do a 
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comparative analysis of blockchain governance, espoused by blockchain developers 
with the governance concepts discussed within social contract theories [10]. Barrera 
and Hurder view blockchain policy upgrade as a coordination game and develop a sim-
ple model of strategic chain choice [11]. Arrunada and Garicano discuss that new forms 
of soft governance need to be developed that allow the decentralized network to avoid 
bad equilibria [12]. In this paper, we discuss the hierarchy of Institutional governance 
within which blockchain governance resides and analyze IT governance as it applies in 
a blockchain organization. The implementation categories of blockchain governance is 
highlighted and Nash equilibrium is used to construct payoff matrices to predict the 
best implementation strategy for blockchain governance. 
3 Blockchain Governance 
Blockchain is a distributed, decentralized network that came into inception with the 
launch of Bitcoin. The coordination of various entities that comprise a blockchain net-
work to ensure that the network functions without conflicts to accomplish the strategic 
goals of the network requires a governance mechanism. The main components that 
comprise the blockchain network can be summarized as follows: 
1. Validators 
2. Users 
3. Consensus Protocol 
4. Governance Mechanism 
A blockchain network is analogous to an organization like Google or Microsoft, with 
its own set of users, employees (validators), protocols and a governance structure. Con-
sider the email services, Gmail provided by Google and Outlook by Microsoft, where 
their purpose is the same but the governance mechanisms of the two corporations, 
Google and Microsoft, differ. Services provided by a blockchain network, like crypto-
currency payments or dapps, can be comparable to the services provided by a technol-
ogy company. The blockchain network built by an organization, example Stellar, will 
put it in the category of a technology company. Presently there are numerous organiza-
tions like Bitcoin, Ethereum and Tezos amongst others, providing a blockchain-based 
infrastructure. The organizations differ in their consensus protocols, governance mech-
anisms, services and strategic goals. Thus, a universal governance mechanism cannot 
exist for blockchain in the wake of multiple service providers for the technology. 
The blockchain network facilitated by an organization will make the respective or-
ganizations be analogous to a technology company, where the standards and frame-
works for corporate governance would be applicable. This view is corroborated by the 
domain of corporate governance, which indicates that "Corporate governance includes 
all types of firms whether or not they are formed under civil or common law, owned by 
the government, institutions or individuals, privately or publicly traded." [13]. This 
implies that firms like Stellar will be in the realm of corporate governance. Corporate 
governance is concerned with the relationship among the many players in an organiza-
tion and the organizational goals for which governance is needed. The different players 
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in an organization are the stakeholders, management, board of directors, employees, 
suppliers, customers, lenders, regulators, the environment and the community at large 
[14]. Corporate governance deals with the set of rules, processes and practices which 
aid in giving the organization a direction and a framework to ensure its functioning is 
within the defined parameters. Corporate governance lies within the realm of different 
Institutional governance systems [15]. Blockchain governance, ensuing from corporate 
governance would essentially follow the similar set of processes and rules to achieve 
the vision of the founders while ensuring that the participants in the network like the 
validators and users contribute to its goals. A good governance protocol would ensure 
that the blockchain would be environmentally friendly, would minimize the occurrence 
of forks and changes in the code would represent the agreement of the majority of the 
agents in the blockchain network. 
 
3.1 IT Governance 
Information Technology (IT) governance is a critical driver for corporate governance. 
It is a component of corporate governance but the relationship between the two remains 
largely unexplored, despite the acknowledgement that an organization would fail to 
accomplish its goals without a good IT governance mechanism [16]. Weill and Ross 
describe IT governance as "specifying the decision rights and accountability to encour-
age desirable behavior in the use of IT" [17]. This definition includes establishment of 
a set of processes and deciding the authorities for providing the input to making deci-
sions. They indicate a set of questions that must be addressed for an effective IT gov-
ernance mechanism, which includes the decisions that must be made for effective man-
agement and use of IT, delegation of authority for decision-making and finally the pro-
cess of decision-making coupled with monitoring. Simonsson and Johnson pointed out 
that a shared definition is lacking in the field of IT governance [18]. They provided an 
IT governance definition based on consolidation of literature, which identified three 
dimensions namely, the domain, processes and scope in which IT decisions are made 
and carried out. In this paper we proceed with the three dimensions that encompass IT 
governance stated in [18] and justify the usage by ensuring conformity to the questions 
addressed by Weill and Ross in [17]. The paper focuses on IT governance as blockchain 
organizations are primarily technology initiatives increasing the significance of IT gov-
ernance in the context of blockchain platforms. 
Domain. The domain dimension includes the entities, the decisions should consider 
and comprise of goals, processes, people and technology [18]. In the context of block-
chain technology, goals of any public blockchain technology majorly encompass the 
characteristics of a blockchain platform, which are as follows: 
1. Trustless: The technology does not depend on intermediaries and third parties for 
conducting transactions. 
2. Immutable: The ledger is incorruptible, being verified by innumerable nodes and 
cryptography ensures a permanent record of transactions. 
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3. Decentralization: The technology is not controlled by a single entity and power is 
distributed. 
4. Availability: The technology does not have a single point of failure. 
5. Auditability: The immutable blockchain ledger is verifiable by anybody. 
6. Confidentiality: The technology is public, yet the identities of the users remain 
pseudonymous. 
 
The goals outlined above might differ in some parameters in case of consortium and 
private blockchain networks. Additional goals of development of advanced protocols 
for enhancement of performance, monitoring of protocol updates or changes and align-
ment to the goals of the stakeholders also exist. 
Examples of processes in blockchain include the implementation and management 
of peer to peer network, the distributed ledger, cryptographic algorithms involved, code 
development and prompt error corrections on detection. The people involved are the 
core developers that create the code to manage the functioning of blockchain technol-
ogy, full nodes that maintain a copy of the entire blockchain ledger to put the code into 
action, the organization, which manages the funds and reimburses the core developers 
and the users, who use the blockchain network. The organization can be for profit like 
Ripple, or non-profit like Stellar. Technology broadly includes the hardware required 
and the software that aids in the setup and implementation of the blockchain network. 
Decision-making process. The second dimension of IT governance is the decision-
making process [18]. Decision-making process involves three phases where the matter 
under consideration is thought over, deliberated and then transformed into a model. The 
model is investigated and then implemented in the organization, which is monitored for 
performance evaluation. In the context of blockchain governance, the first phase can be 
considered equivalent to the protocol submission in Ethereum as Ethereum Improve-
ment Proposal (off-chain governance (subsection 3.2)) or proposal submission in Tezos 
(on-chain governance (subsection 3.2)).The protocol can then be implemented in the 
testnet as in Tezos and voting ensues to deliberate upon its acceptance. If a majority is 
reached in the voting process involving the decision-makers, the protocol is imple-
mented in the main blockchain network and monitored for any software bugs. Thus, the 
process is similar to IT governance and a formal framework would necessitate the ad-
herence to all the three phases in order. 
Scope. The last and third dimension in the definition of IT governance involves a dis-
cussion on the scope. Every governance decision implies a long and a short-term aspect 
with a correlation between the timeline of the decision and the level at which it is made 
[18]. The scope dimension encompasses tactic and strategic decisions. In the context of 
a blockchain network, tactic governance decisions can be changing the user interface 
of the blockchain network whereas a strategic decision would involve a protocol up-
date. 
A brief discussion of the three dimensions of an IT governance framework as it ap-
plies to designing an effective blockchain governance mechanism indicates that the 
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questions that need to be addressed for an effective governance framework as per Weill 
and Ross [17] have been majorly targeted. However as per the definition of IT govern-
ance "to encourage desirable behavior in the use of IT", there is a clear indicator on the 
use of incentives, which can be both monetary and non-monetary. The emphasis on 
incentives is less in this definition but they have been recognized as pivotal in the design 
and evaluation of any information system [19]. When the blockchain network is de-
signed such that the users are encouraged and incentivized to use the network as per the 
design objectives then a very important design goal is accomplished. This incentive 
alignment can be derived from the theory of Nash equilibrium [20] or the principles of 
game theory as they apply to institutional economics [21]. Fig. 1 represents the hierar-
chy of governance in blockchain. 
 
Fig. 1. Hierarchy of Governance in Blockchain 
3.2 Implementation Methodologies for Blockchain Governance 
The implementation of blockchain governance can be either off-chain or on-chain. Off-
chain governance is seen in Bitcoin and Ethereum, which is characterized by an infor-
mal decision-making process independent of the underlying blockchain code base. Off-
chain governance resembles the traditional governance mechanisms with relative cen-
tralization and distribution of power between the blockchain agents. Users who lack the 
technical expertise or the requisite financial resources fail to contribute to the governing 
decisions. The off-chain design mechanism for governance is driven by the belief that 
governance is an unpredictable and emergent phenomenon, which cannot be hardcoded 
into the blockchain in advance. The protocol updates are submitted by the core devel-
opers in the form of formal improvement proposals, for example as Bitcoin Improve-
ment Proposals (BIPs) in Bitcoin [22]. The e-proposals are then deliberated through 
social media and discussion groups. One of the issues with off-chain governance is lack 
of incentives for the proposers, which can lead to a small group of developers submit-
ting proposals and hence centralization. 
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On-chain governance embodies the spirit of decentralization in the governance 
mechanisms as seen in Tezos. The concentration of power witnessed in off-chain gov-
ernance strategy is minimized and the governance is implemented by virtue of a series 
of processes as opposed to a simple majority consensus. The exact procedure in on-
chain governance might vary between different blockchain platforms. The proposals 
are submitted on-chain, voted and if agreed upon are deployed on the blockchain testnet 
for a designated amount of time. If the final vote is in favor after the testnet deployment, 
then the proposal is incorporated in the main blockchain. In order to achieve the settle-
ment, governance rules are written into code and are a part of the blockchain enhancing 
transparency. It also reduces the turnaround time for a proposed protocol update. The 
infrastructure required for a well-functioning on-chain governance is huge compara-
tively and research is in progress for the requisite coordination tools that facilitate an 
efficient communication in on-chain governance [23]. 
4 Nash Equilibrium 
Non-cooperative games in game theory are those where competition exists amongst the 
individual players and it is characterized by an absence of rules that enforce cooperative 
behavior. Blockchain platforms can be viewed as non-cooperative games between the 
validators, who compete to add the next block to gain an economic advantage. Nash 
equilibrium can be used to derive a solution for non-cooperative games and can be 
utilized to aid in predicting optimum equilibria in blockchain governance [11]. In the 
mathematical context, if it is proved that a Nash equilibrium exists then this is equiva-
lent to proving that a solution exists for a fixed-term problem [24]. Nash equilibrium 
introduced the concept of games with n participants, players, where each would need 
to decide on a course of action, strategy. Strategies can be pure or mixed. A pure strat-
egy gives the moves a player will make during the course of the game under any situa-
tion. In blockchain governance, it represents the set of all possible choices a player can 
make. Mixed strategies are probability distributions over decisions as in the context of 
choosing a proposal, different agents in the blockchain network will choose one from 
the available choices ensuring that all the choices are taken by a random proportion of 
the agents. A pure strategy is analogous to a degenerate case of a mixed strategy, where 
the concerned pure strategy is chosen with a probability 1, whereas all others are chosen 
with a probability of 0. 
Nash equilibrium can be stated as a "set of strategies, one for each of the n players 
of a game, that has the property that each player's choice is his best response to the 
choices of the n-1 other players"  [20] [25]. A payoff matrix is used to represent the 
available strategies and the players, where each cell of the matrix gives the outcome of 
different choices by each player. The matrix gives the outcome of an individual's choice 
of strategy in terms of gain or loss that a player undergoes, when his choice of strategy 
is executed, given the choice of other players. Thereafter, the matrix is analyzed to 
determine optimal strategies. John Nash in [25] defined that a n-person game is a set of 
n players or positions, where each player, i, has a finite set of pure strategies and a 
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payoff function, pi mapping the entire set of n-tuples of pure strategies into real num-
bers. The term n-tuples implies a set of n items, where each item is associated with a 
different player [25]. The mixed strategy of a player is a collection of positive numbers 
that are in one to one correspondence with his pure strategies and have unit sum. The 
payoff function pi is characterized by a unique extension to the n-tuples of mixed strat-
egies and is linear in the mixed strategy of each player. The equilibrium point is a n-
tuple where each player's mixed strategy maximizes his payoff if the strategies of other 
players is not changed. Thus, at equilibrium point each player's strategy is optimal 
against those of others [25]. 
4.1 Pareto Optimality 
In game theory if a solution is Pareto optimal, then this implies that the strategy profile 
is such that there can be no other strategy in which a player's payoff can be increased, 
without decreasing the payoff of at least one other player. A strong Nash equilibrium, 
which implies stability against unilateral deviations of players and also against unilat-
eral deviations of any subcoalition of players, is Pareto optimal [26]. 
5 Application of Nash Equilibrium to Blockchain Governance 
Blockchain governance has some distinctive features differentiating it from traditional 
corporate governance processes, as given below: 
• Decentralized nature of governance, where the main role of the governance mecha-
nism is to steer the community to achieve certain outcomes without having explicit 
levers to achieve these outcomes. 
• Possibility of forks or opting out if the outcome is not aligned with individual goals 
is relatively hard wired in the whole governance process unlike the corporate setting 
where the cost benefit of opting out are quite high and in many cases might imply 
starting completely afresh. 
• The decision of the individual on a blockchain platform is based not just on an indi-
vidual choice but the impact that it is likely to have on the entire blockchain network, 
through the community’s collective decision, resulting in a network effect. 
 
We have applied Nash equilibrium to blockchain governance and simplified the gov-
ernance process as a two-player strategy game, where voters V are a group of k entities 
involved in the voting of acceptance and rejection of a proposal, which is the decision-
making process when viewed from the perspective of IT governance. The impact of the 
decision will be on the broader community C connected to the blockchain and compris-
ing of n entities. The payoff matrix for our evaluation is given in Fig. 2. β represents 
the proportion of voters, V, who voted to accept the proposal by a Yes whereas γ rep-
resents the proportion of the broader community moving to the upgraded chain once a 
proposal is accepted based on the outcome of the voting process. V comprises of vali-
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dators, who validate the transactions in blockchain, developers, blockchain token hold-
ers, blockchain stakeholders and any user of the blockchain platform who participate 
in the voting process of any new blockchain proposal under consideration. C consists 
of all blockchain users who will be affected by the decision, including V. 
 
Fig. 2. Payoff Matrix for Blockchain Governance Game 
Whenever any proposal to update the blockchain code is initiated, the individual mem-
bers of V must decide if they want to vote to accept the proposal, Yes, or reject the 
same, No. Once the voting cycle for a new proposal is over, and there is no uniform 
consensus, the individual (in larger C) must choose between two chains: stay on the 
original chain O or join the new upgraded chain with an updated policy U. The payoff 
matrix given in Fig. 2 enumerates two strategies, Yes and No for V as described for-
merly and C also has two strategies, which are Upgraded Chain and Original Chain. 
 
 𝑉(𝑘) = {𝑌,𝑁} ⊆ 𝐶(𝑛) = {𝑂, 𝑈} (1) 
Payoff (S) is the cumulative of individual payoffs as a result of the decision. We have 
assumed no distinction between entities in the Voter, (V) and Community, (C) in the 
value of payoffs (Sv, Sc): 
 𝑆(𝑉) = ∑ 𝑆(𝑉2) = 𝑘𝑆34256  (2) 
 𝑆(𝐶) = ∑ 𝑆(𝐶2) = 𝑛𝑆78256  (3) 
5.1 Simulation of Blockchain Governance Game 
We use the software tools for game theory, version 15.1.1, provided by the Gambit 
project [27] to simulate a 2 player strategy game for V and C, the payoff matrix of 
which is given in Fig. 2. Gambit was used to compute all possible Nash equilibria for 
different values of β and γ and the computation results are depicted in Table 1. Player 
1 is V and player 2 is C in Table 1. An analysis of the computations in Table 1 is given 
below: 
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• Simulation 1. There is only one Nash equilibrium, where 100% of V vote 'Yes' to 
accept the proposal and the entire broader community C moves to the upgraded 
chain.  
• Simulation 2. There is only one Nash equilibrium where 100% of V vote 'No' to 
reject the proposal and the entire broader community C stays on the original chain.   
• Simulation 3. There is only one Nash equilibrium where 100% of V vote 'Yes' to 
accept the proposal but entire C stays on the original chain, ignoring the outcome of 
the voting process. 
• Simulation 4. There is only one Nash equilibrium where 100% of V vote 'No' to 
reject the proposal but entire C still move to the upgraded chain, ignoring the out-
come of the voting process. 
• Simulation 5. There are 4 Nash equilibria. Equilibria 1 and 2 indicate that when 50% 
of V vote as 'Yes' to accept the proposal there are two optimal decisions for C, where 
C can either stay on the original chain or move to the upgraded chain. Equilibria 3 
and 4 indicate that when 50% of V vote 'No' to reject the proposal, the optimal deci-
sion for C will again be that the community stays on the original chain or moves to 
the upgraded chain. In the equilibria for this simulation, the community will be di-
vided.  
Table 1. Simulation of Blockchain Governance Game 
Simu-
lation # β, γ 
Nash 
Equilib-
ria # 
1: 
Yes 
1: 
No 
2: 
Upgraded 
Chain 
2: 
Original 
Chain 
V 
Payoff 
C  
Payoff 
1 1, 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 
2 0, 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 
3 1, 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
4 0, 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 
5 1/2, 1/2 1 1 0 1 0 1/2 ½ 
  2 1 0 0 1   
  3 0 1 1 0   
  4 0 1 0 1   
6 3/5, 7/10 1 1 0 1 0 3/5 7/10 
7 1/5, 2/5 1 0 1 0 1 4/5 3/5 
8 7/10, 1/5 1 1 0 0 1 7/10 4/5 
9 7/20, 18/25 1 0 1 1 0 13/20 18/25 
• Simulation 6. In this the value of [β, γ > 0.5]. There is only one equilibrium where 
60% of V vote 'Yes' to accept the proposal and 70% of C move to the upgraded 
chain. 
• Simulation 7. The value of [β, γ < 0.5] and there is only one Nash equilibrium. When 
80% of V vote 'No' to reject the proposal, 60% of C stay on the original chain. 
• Simulation 8. The value of β > 0.5 and γ < 0.5. There is only one Nash equilibrium 
where despite 70% of V voting 'Yes' to accept the proposal, 80% of C stay on the 
original chain, ignoring the outcome of the voting process. 
• Simulation 9. The value of β < 0.5 and γ > 0.5. There is only one Nash equilibrium 
where 35% of V vote 'Yes' to accept the proposal, 65% of V vote ‘No’ and 72% of 
C move to the upgraded chain, ignoring the outcome of the voting process.  
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The above analyses can be concluded with the following observations:  
1. The broader community, C can take a decision independent of the outcome of the 
voting process. 
2. If the proportion of V voting 'Yes' or 'No' to a proposal is known, the payoff matrix 
in Fig. 2 can be used to predict the optimal outcomes for C. 
3. When C is divided on the outcome as in simulation 5, then there will always be more 
members on either the original or the upgraded chain increasing the payoff of that 
chain. 
5.2 Evaluation of Different Kinds of Blockchain Governance 
We evaluate three possible scenarios of blockchain governance. We analyze the case 
of no governance and then investigate the performance of off-chain and on-chain gov-
ernance mechanisms on the payoff to the community under specific conditions. We 
derive mathematical formulae based on our evaluation to aid in prediction of optimal 
strategies for blockchain governance and make the following assumptions for our anal-
ysis: 
1. β is the proportion of the voters V, voting Yes to accept a new proposal and can be 
extended to represent the entire community C. 
2. The proposal is accepted if the majority of voters vote Yes in favor of the proposal. 
This implies that 0.5 < 𝛽	 ≤ 1. 
3. If β = 0.5, then the above majority rule in assumption 2 will apply.  
4. The broader community C moves to the upgraded chain, U, if voting was in majority 
for the proposal acceptance as indicated by assumptions 2 and 3.  
5. C moving to the upgraded chain, U, indicates that 0.5	 ≤ 𝛾	 ≤ 1.  
6. Only two possibilities exist for the entire community, which is that they either stay 
on the original chain, O or move to the upgraded chain, U post the decision following 
the voting process. We have ignored that a section of the community can create a 
new hard fork, separate from the original and upgraded chain. 
No Governance. In the scenario of no governance each C member is choosing the best 
possible option for their own benefit whenever any change is made to the chain. The 
individual decision-making is complicated by a high degree of opacity in information 
exchange on proposed changes, relative payoff to the community and the possibility of 
hard fork occurring as a result of the change. Let γ be the proportion of C which chooses 
to move to the upgraded chain while (1- γ) choose to remain on the original chain. The 
payoffs are reduced on both chains as compared to single-chain equilibria by a factor 
[γ, (1-γ)] on U, O chains respectively. In equation 4, SU represents total payoff in up-
graded chain and in equation 5, SO represents total payoff in original chain. 
 𝑆B = 	𝛾𝑛𝑆C 	≤ 𝑛𝑆C (4) 
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 𝑆D = (1 − 𝛾)𝑛𝑆C ≤ 	𝑛𝑆C (5) 
Off-chain Governance. Fig. 3(a) depicts the off-chain governance mechanism (see 
subsection 3.2) with proportion β of voter community voting yes if there is no outright 
consensus. Depending on the majority preference, the chain is upgraded or the original 
is maintained. After the outcome is known, everyone has an option of staying on the 
upgraded chain or the original chain. The voting process is a group exercise while the 
hard fork decisions are individual. In this case with the information available, the mem-
ber is more likely to go with the majority decision in order to maximize payoff, hence 
the probability of hard fork is lower than the previous case of no governance. 
 
 
                            (a)                                                            (b) 
Fig. 3. Flowchart for Off-chain and On-chain Blockchain Governance          
On-chain Blockchain Governance. Fig. 3(b) depicts the on-chain governance mech-
anism (see subsection 3.2) where the proposal is deployed on the testnet for voter com-
munity to use for a certain time period. The mechanism defers from the simple majority 
voting as in this case the objective is payoff maximization through maximum consen-
sus. Thus, a vocal minority which feels strongly about any proposed change has the 
possibility to convince the community during the testnet phase. If there is no uniform 
consensus after testnet phase, the proposals are put to vote with majority chain being 
chosen. The possibility of hard fork will remain but with an additional exchange round 
13 
the probability of C group member going against the majority consensus reduces as 
compared to both the previous cases of no governance and off-chain governance. 
5.3 Off-chain Governance Payoff Matrices 
We construct payoff matrices for off-chain blockchain governance using the basic 
blockchain governance matrix given in Fig. 2. We constructed 3 matrices of dimensions 
2´2 for the respective values of β, γ indicated in the different rows of Fig. 4. We se-
lected rows from the constructed matrices, which corresponded to the assumptions 
listed in subsection 5.2 and depicted them in a new matrix in Fig. 4. The matrix can be 
explained with the following strategy for V, C: 
• If V validates the proposal as accepted then the chain is upgraded, the payoff is max-
imized and there is no threat of hard fork as shown in the cell, A1 of the evaluation 
matrix. This is a pure strategy equilibrium. Equation 6 gives the surplus payoff for 
the voters S(V), while equation 7 gives the surplus payoff for the community S(C). 
 
 
Fig. 4. Evaluation Matrix for Off-chain Blockchain Governance 
 𝑆(𝑉) = 	𝑆FGH −	𝑆IJ = 𝑘𝑆K (6) 
 𝑆(𝐶) = 	𝑆B −	𝑆D = 𝑛𝑆C (7) 
• If V does not validate the proposal but after a round of voting, majority chooses to 
go with the proposal there is risk of hard fork with members of C, who may feel the 
decision as tyranny of majority choosing to remain on the original chain. However 
surplus maximization still exists with upgraded chain, as depicted in cell B1 of the 
payoff matrix, as [0.5 < β, γ < 1]. This is also Pareto optimal as compared to the 
original chain, B2, as members moving to alternate chain to increase their payoff 
always results in decreasing the payoff for others. Equation 8 gives the surplus pay-
off for the voters S(V), equation 9 gives the surplus payoff for the community and 
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equation 10 gives the total surplus payoff S. When we compare the mixed strategy 
equilibria for cells B1 and B2, we observe that the payoff in B1 is more than in B2. 
 𝑆(𝑉) = 	𝑆FGH −	𝑆IJ = 𝛽𝑘𝑆K	 − (1 − 𝛽)𝑘𝑆K = (2𝛽 − 1)𝑘𝑆K > 0 (8) 
 𝑆(𝐶) = 	𝑆B − 𝑆D = 𝛾𝑛𝑆C − (1 − 𝛾)𝑛𝑆C = (2𝛾 − 1)𝑛𝑆C > 0 (9) 
 𝑆 = (2𝛽 − 1)𝑘𝑆K	 +	(2𝛾 − 1)𝑛𝑆C > 0 (10) 
• If V does not validate the proposal but after a round of voting, majority chooses to 
stay on the original proposal there is again a risk of hard fork with some members of 
C choosing to go on the updated chain. In this case surplus maximization will be 
with original chain, C2 as [0.5 < 1-β, 1-γ < 1]. This is also Pareto optimal as com-
pared to the original chain, as seen in C1 members moving to alternate chain to in-
crease their payoff always results in decreasing the payoff for others. Equation 11 
gives the surplus payoff for the voters S(V), equation 12 gives the surplus payoff for 
the community S(C) and equation 13 gives the total surplus payoff. Similar to the 
argument in the comparison of the payoff in B1 and B2, the mixed strategy equilibria 
in C2 when compared with the mixed strategy equilibria in C1 has a higher payoff. 
 𝑆(𝑉) = 	𝑆IJ − 𝑆FGH = (1 − 𝛽)𝑘𝑆K − 𝛽𝑘𝑆K = (1 − 2𝛽)𝑘𝑆K > 0 (11) 
 𝑆(𝐶) = 	𝑆D −	𝑆B = (1 − 𝛾)𝑛𝑆C − 𝛾𝑛𝑆C = (1 − 2𝛾)𝑛𝑆C > 0 (12) 
 𝑆 = (1 − 2𝛾)𝑛𝑆C + (1 − 2𝛽)𝑘𝑆K > 0 (13) 
5.4 On-chain Blockchain Governance Payoff Matrices 
We construct payoff matrices for on-chain blockchain governance using the basic 
blockchain governance matrix given in Fig. 2. We constructed 3 matrices of dimensions 
2´2 for the respective values of β, γ indicated in the different rows of Fig. 5. We se-
lected rows from the constructed matrices, which corresponded to the assumptions 
listed in subsection 5.2 and depicted them in a new matrix in Fig. 5. The matrix can be 
explained with the following strategy for V, C: 
•  If V validates the proposal as accepted then the chain is upgraded, the payoff is 
maximized and there is no threat of hard fork as depicted in the cell, A1 of the eval-
uation matrix. This is a pure strategy equilibrium. Equation 6 gives the surplus pay-
off for the voters S(V), while equation 7 gives the surplus payoff for the community. 
•  If V does not validate the proposal and even after the testnet round there is no con-
sensus, then the voting takes place with the majority choosing to go with the pro-
posal. The risk of hard fork is still there but is reduced as compared to off-chain as 
there has been a round of consultation and refinement. The surplus maximization is 
with upgraded chain, B1, as [0.5 < β, γ < 1]. This is also Pareto optimal as compared 
to the original chain, B2. Equation 8 gives the surplus payoff for the voters S(V), 
equation 9 gives the surplus payoff for the community and equation 10 gives the 
total surplus payoff S. When we compare the mixed strategy equilibria for cells B1 
and B2, we observe that the payoff in B1 is more than in B2. 
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• If after the voting, post testnet round, the majority chooses to remain with the origi-
nal proposal, there is a possibility that the upgraded proposal will be payoff maxim-
izing because of vocal minority with intense preference can convince more C mem-
bers to go in for the upgraded chain γ'> γ, thus increasing the total community payoff. 
The risk of hard fork is there, based on proportion of C members who prefer coordi-
nating to maximize payoff, when compared to those who wish to go with the major-
ity opinion. As γ' increases more members shift to upgraded chain thus neutralizing 
the majority vote. Equation 14 gives the surplus payoff for the voters S(V), equation 
15 gives the surplus payoff for the community S(C) and equation 16 gives the total 
surplus payoff, S. If S > 0, majority will move to the upgraded chain as seen in 
equation 17. If S < 0, then the majority will stay on the original chain as seen in 
equation 18. 
 𝑆(𝑉) = 𝑆FGH − 𝑆IJ = 𝛽𝑘𝑆K − (1 − 𝛽)𝑘𝑆K= (2𝛽 − 1)𝑘𝑆K < 0  (14) 
 𝑆(𝐶) = 	𝑆B − 𝑆D = 𝛾O𝑛𝑆C − (1 − 𝛾′)𝑛𝑆C=(2	𝛾O − 1)n𝑆C > 0 (15) 
 𝑆 = (2𝛾O − 1)𝑛𝑆C + (2𝛽 − 1)𝑘𝑆K (16) 
 𝑆	 > 0, 𝑖𝑓		(2𝛾O − 1)𝑛𝑆C	 > 	−(2𝛽 − 1)𝑘𝑆K = (1 − 2𝛽)𝑘𝑆K (17) 
 𝑆 < 0, 𝑖𝑓		(2𝛾O − 1)𝑛𝑆C < (1 − 2𝛽)𝑘𝑆K (18) 
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6 Application of the Proposed Mathematical Formulae to Real 
Data 
We use Ethereum data to verify our proposed mathematical formulae for prediction of 
optimal strategies. Ethereum has off-chain governance and after the DAO hack there 
was a proposal to upgrade the chain in 2016. Major mining pools, amounting to 54%, 
supported the decision by voting 'Yes' [28] making β = 0.54. This scenario corresponds 
to the 2nd row of the evaluation matrix in Fig. 4 with cells B1 (upgraded chain) and B2 
(original chain). As per our analysis in subsection 5.3, the risk of hard fork exists. How-
ever, cell B1 represents a Pareto optimal condition with surplus maximization existing 
with the upgraded chain, where the payoff of B1 is more than B2 as validated by equa-
tions 8, 9 and 10. This will result in the community moving to the upgraded chain (B1). 
As it was witnessed, a decision was taken by the Ethereum community to go for the 
protocol update and this resulted in a split in the community C, creating the hard fork 
Ethereum (upgraded chain). The present day metrics of the upgraded chain (Ethereum) 
[29] and the original chain (Ethereum Classic) [30] is a validation of  our predictions 
in equations 8, 9 and 10 indicating that the payoff is more with the upgraded chain 
(Ethereum), where the majority of the community moved to. 
7 Conclusion 
In this paper we analyzed the position of blockchain governance in the hierarchy of 
Institutional governance to derive a formal structure for blockchain governance. The 
paper viewed blockchain governance from the dimensions of IT governance and then 
analyzed one dimension of IT governance, namely decision-making process as in the 
form of voting on a new blockchain improvement proposal, by using Nash equilibria to 
predict optimal governance strategies. The objectives of the governance process may 
vary with the blockchain platform, its community composition and business logic. A 
game theory simulation of the respective strategies of the players was used in an attempt 
to define the most optimum scenarios based on choices made by the voters or the 
broader community. The paper, through an analysis of the payoff matrices, provides 
mathematical formulae that can predict the occurrence of a hard fork on acceptance/ 
rejection of a new proposal as well as give an indication whether the majority of the 
community will move to the upgraded chain or stay on the original chain. We tried to 
maximize the payoff for the community while steering them to desired outcomes in our 
analyses and it was observed that a split in the community through a hard fork dimin-
ishes the payoff. Off-chain governance mechanism tries to avoid the potential loss of 
payoff through an inclusive voting process while on-chain includes a pilot testing with 
an inclusive voting process. On-chain provides an added opportunity to change the 
value of γ and hence can be concluded as a better governance proposition. 
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